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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES

Funda TELATAR.

Abstract
This paper reviews the theory of political business cycle, which analyzes the interaction of political and economic system, paying special attention to the most influential works on it. This literature has developed in two distinct phases. The first phase is shaped, in the mid-seventies, by Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976) on 'opportunistic' cycles, and by Hibbs (1977) on 'partisan' cycles. The common features of the works in this phase are that the economy is defined by a 'pre-rational expectations' model and that an exploitable Phillips curve is used. The second phase took off in the mid-eighties as a branch of game-theoretic approach to the positive theory of policy. In this phase, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), and Persson and Tabeliini (1990)propose 'rational opportunistic' models; Alesina (1987) develops a 'rational partisan' approach.

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MAKROEKONOMİ-SİYASET İLİŞKİLERİ: POLİTİK DEVRESEL DALGALANMALAR

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Anahtar Kelimeler: yok


 
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How to Cite this Article
Pubmed Style

Funda TELATAR. [THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES]. Ekonomik Yaklasim. 1998; 9(31): 37-60. Turkish. doi:10.5455/ey.10298


Web Style

Funda TELATAR. [THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES]. http://www.ekonomikyaklasim.org/?mno=155517 [Access: May 24, 2019]. Turkish. doi:10.5455/ey.10298


AMA (American Medical Association) Style

Funda TELATAR. [THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES]. Ekonomik Yaklasim. 1998; 9(31): 37-60. Turkish. doi:10.5455/ey.10298



Vancouver/ICMJE Style

Funda TELATAR. [THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES]. Ekonomik Yaklasim. (1998), [cited May 24, 2019]; 9(31): 37-60. Turkish. doi:10.5455/ey.10298



Harvard Style

Funda TELATAR (1998) [THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES]. Ekonomik Yaklasim, 9 (31), 37-60. Turkish. doi:10.5455/ey.10298



Turabian Style

Funda TELATAR. 1998. [THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES]. Ekonomik Yaklasim, 9 (31), 37-60. Turkish. doi:10.5455/ey.10298



Chicago Style

Funda TELATAR. "[THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES]." Ekonomik Yaklasim 9 (1998), 37-60. Turkish. doi:10.5455/ey.10298



MLA (The Modern Language Association) Style

Funda TELATAR. "[THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES]." Ekonomik Yaklasim 9.31 (1998), 37-60. Print.Turkish. doi:10.5455/ey.10298



APA (American Psychological Association) Style

Funda TELATAR (1998) [THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MACROECONOMICS AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES]. Ekonomik Yaklasim, 9 (31), 37-60. Turkish. doi:10.5455/ey.10298